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§1 Introduction
The ubiquity of norms is overwhelming. There are (detailed) norms regulating
our behavior in community at large, there are norms that regulate our actions
in the school we attend, in the organizations we join, in the workplace we
frequent. There are norms that tell us what to wear, how to eat and how much
real fruit there should be in orange juice. The sequence of characters on this
page is dictated by a norm. The important occasions in our lives ranging from
birth to burial are structured by norms. In addition, there are norms regulating
property, economic transactions, taxes, and there are norms which form the
basic structure of society.
No wonder then that philosophers and social scientists alike always have
been interested in norms. The challenge is to provide a theory that explains the
nature of our norms. One such theory is conventionalism. Conventionalism
makes the following claims. First, that it is instrumentally rational to comply
with norms. This is reductionism: norms are a subset of the set of rational
prescriptions. Conventionalist theories are not alone in this adherence to
reductionism. For example, Hobbesian contractarianism holds that one should
comply with moral prescriptions in so far as they are the result of a
hypothetical contract between rational agents. What distinguishes
conventionalist theories from other reductionist theories of norms is the second
claim of conventionalism: (part of) the reason that this is rational to comply
with a norm is because it is known that all, or a sufficiently great number of
others in the group, comply with those norms. This is conformity.
With the introduction of game theory in the social sciences,
conventionalism has been reformulated in game theoretic terms. Though the
pioneering work was done in the sixties by Thomas Schelling and David Lewis,
the real “boom” is of the last twenty years or so of this century.1 We have
witnessed a plethora of publications that formulate models to explain the
emergence and stability of norms. In this paper I will try to determine how
                                                
1 Schelling, Thomas (1960), The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.;
Lewis, David (1969), Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge: Harvard University Press..
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successful the conventionalist, game theoretic models are as characterizations
of the nature of norms. In particular, I will raise the question whether the
models explain the characteristics of what we intuitively would label as a
“norm” or whether something is lacking.
Section 2 presents an informal definition of norms that is derived from the
work of Hart (1961; Winch (1990). Section 3 and 4 discuss a simple model of a
property norm based on the “hawk-dove” game. Section 5 assesses whether
this model can account for possibility of deviance from a norm. Section 6
discusses the role of sanctions in the model. Section 7 argues that sanctions
presuppose the existence of moral motives. Section 8 deals with how deviance
provokes resentment. Section 9 provides an alternative analysis of resentment,
which shows that resentment presupposes moral motives. Section 10 draws
some conclusions about the success of game theory in the analysis of social
norms.
§2 Characteristics of norms
First, we need to clarify the intuitive concept of norms. In what follows I give a
list of features of norms. I am reluctant to claim that it is an exhaustive list. Nor
am I claiming that any of these features are necessary or sufficient.2 However, if
we find the sort of things that have (most of) these features, it is likely that we
are dealing with a norm.
To determine whether a group follows a norm, the following phenomena
are relevant:
(1) There exists regularity in behavior. This immediately leads to a puzzle. What if
nobody behaves as the norm prescribes, yet everyone judges behavior in
terms of that norm? A plausible reaction to this puzzle is to claim that in
such situations, a judgment in terms of a norm that is generally deviated
                                                
2  My reluctance is motivated by two considerations. First, the aim here is to characterize norms
and then see whether a particular theory or model captures this characterization. Such a theory
would formulate a definition of norms. Providing a definition of a norm – as opposed to a
characterization – presupposes a theory of norms. However, this is not so terribly important. I
am willing to accept that what we intuitively label “norms” is theory-laden in this sense. The
aim then becomes to formulate a theory that expresses these intuitions optimally.
My main consideration is that I am not altogether convinced that these features are
sufficient to separate what we would intuitively characterize as a norm. A good example is the
“rule” in baseball that the third-base man should draw in when he expects a bunt. It satisfies all
the criteria but is it what we label a “norm”? Personally, I would be inclined to say it is, but
others do not. For example, [Shapiro, 1998 #840].
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from cannot be taken seriously. Such a judgment is more like an
unreasonable ritual. It does not follow from an existing norm Bartsch (1983).
(2) This regularity can be acquired through learning. Not all regularities in behavior
are norm-guided. Babies sleep a lot, people are repelled by the smell of
rotten eggs, and lions defend their young. None of these just mentioned
phenomena are norm-guided. They are determined by biological, physical,
or other facts of the species. What we are after concerns regularities which
are not imposed on us in this manner.
(3) Deviation from the norm is possible. This feature is connected to the second
criterion. Normally, one learns a rule by trial and error, by both conforming
to it and by occasionally deviating from it.
(4) Those concerned are able to detect deviations from the norm. That is, when
confronted with deviant behavior, the norm followers are able to recognize
it as deviance. Of course this does not have to be perfect. Nor does it have to
be the case that those concerned can give an exact formulation of the
differences between compliant and deviant behavior.
(5) Deviations are met with reproach. This reproach can take the form of
punishment, as in criminal law, or other (informal) forms of social control.
(6) This reproach can be a reason to change one’s behavior.
(7) Reproach of deviations is regarded as correct or legitimate. This will result in
deviants either exercising self-criticism or denying the correctness of the
negative response. Conversely, those exercising criticism will regard their
reproach as correct. As we shall see, it is precisely this feature that
conventionalist theories have difficulties in explaining.
Summarizing the features of the list, we get the following informal
“definition”: when we think of norms we think of regularities in behavior that
are socially transferred, and deviations from which can be recognized and will
be criticized in some manner, where those concerned will regard this criticism
as appropriate.
§3 A model for conventions of property
How does a conventionalist analysis of norms capture these characteristics?
Evolutionary game theory has been employed in demonstrating how these
regularities emerge and can be stable. In order to appreciate their success as an
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explanation of norms, I will present one relatively simple designed to capture
(part of) property norms.
Property can be understood as the allocation of scarce resources. The fact
that resources are scarce generates conflict between agents who have a use for
the disputed resource. Imagine the following situation: two contestants are in
conflict over a resource. This conflict is not an all or nothing affair; it is not a
zero-sum game. For one thing, one of the contestants could simply give in and
invest energy in finding another resource. On the other hand he could choose to
fight. However, fighting is costly. In fact if both contestants decide to fight, they
are both worse off than had they both decided not to fight and give in.
Contestant A then has the following ordering over the possible results of their
conflict: A prefers most the situation in which she gets the resource and B just
gives in and moves away. Second on A’s ordering is the outcome in which they
both give in and share the resource. A costly fight has been avoided. Third is
the situation in which B gets the resource after A has given in. Again a fight has
been avoided and A has enough energy left to move on and try and find
another resource. Utterly disastrous would be the situation in which both
decide to fight, thus draining each other’s energy to get any resource. Since B’s
ordering is symmetrical to that of A, we can conclude that they are involved in














Figure 1, the chicken game
                                                
3 This name is derived from a game of bravado apparently played by some American teenagers
Rapoport, Anatole (1967), "Exploiter, Leader, Hero, and Martyr: The Four Archetypes of the 2 x
2 Game", Behavioral Science 12: 81-84.. Biologists know this game as the Hawk-Dove game Smith,
John Maynard (1982), Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.. I follow the social scientist’s nomenclature here.
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What should A and B respectively choose? There is no dominant strategy for
either player. Their best reply depends upon the reply of the other. There are
three equilibria in this game: two equilibria in pure strategies and one mixed
equilibrium. Which one will be selected, if any?
To answer this question, the following assumption is crucial. We assume,
as is typical for evolutionary game theory, that this is not a unique situation.
There are many occasions where people like A and B will be in conflict over
scarce resources. In other words, the game is a repeated game, in which a finite
set of players is anonymously, randomly paired in each round.
Suppose that both players know exactly those things that classical game
theory presupposes. That is, they know the possible outcomes and each other’s
payoffs. Furthermore, they know the other to be rational and all this is common
knowledge. However, any additional information about the role of the
contestants, even the labels of the strategies (i.e., “fight” and “give in”) is
unknown to them. One can demonstrate that in that case the only viable
equilibrium in the long run is the mixed equilibrium.
Suppose that originally the population exists of “fighters” only. The
average pay-off to a typical fighter equals 0: the result of an encounter with
another fighter. Suppose that a mutant peace-lover enters the population. The
average pay-off of this latter is much higher than that of the fighters. A peace-
lover would end up with 1 whereas the typical fighter gets 0. In other words,
there is an evolutionary pressure on the member of this population to switch
from fighting to giving in. What is more, the more peace-lovers there are the
higher the chances that two peace-lovers will meet, which would result in 2. So
the push towards the peace-loving strategy will become stronger as more and
more players switch strategy. However, this pressure is not such that the entire
population will evolve towards peace-loving behavior. For if the entire
population were to consist of peace-lovers, a mutant fighter would do
extremely well, scoring 3 on all his encounters, which would generate a trend
away from the peace-loving strategy.
This does not mean that this population would cycle between a state near
all fighters and a state of nearly all peace-lovers. We can make the analysis of
this game a bit more precise. There is a so-called mixed equilibrium between
those two states, which is that situation where the a player fights in each
encounter with probability p.4 A strategy is in equilibrium if and only if the
                                                
4 It is a difficult question how to interpret the mixed equilibria in standard game theory. This
difficulty has been recognized since the beginnings of game theory. See for example Luce, R.
Duncan and Howard Raiffa (1957), Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, New
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equilibrium strategy I does at least as well against itself as any mutant (i.e. a
strategy other than I), that is E(I, I)‡E(J, I).5 Let I be the equilibrium strategy that
fights with probability p, and J a mutant strategy that fights with probability q,
then E(I, I)‡E(J, I) if and only if p=0.5. Note that following strategy I gives a
typical player in this population an average pay-off of 1.5.6
More important that this result is the fact that this equilibrium is
evolutionary stable. The concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) was first
introduced by the mathematical biologist John Maynard Smith:
An ESS is such a strategy that, if all members of the population
adopt it, then no mutant could invade the population under the
influence of natural selection.7
This stability is the case when two conditions are fulfilled. Let I and J be
strategies, pure or mixed. Then I is an ESS if and only if:
(1) For all J it is the case that E(I,I)‡E(J,I), and
(2) For all J, such I„ J, either E(I,I)>E(J,I) or E(I,J)>E(J,J)
Of these two conditions (1) is the equilibrium condition (“I is a best reply to
itself”) and (2) is the stability criterion. Condition (2) requires either that I is the
unique best reply against itself, or that it does better against other strategies
than those strategies against themselves. In either case, mutants will not be able
to invade the population.
                                                                                                                                              
York: Wiley.. On the one hand, one could think of them as a description of the composition of
the population. This is the favored interpretation among evolutionary game-theorists, social
scientists and biologists. Alternatively one can regard the mixed equilibrium as a description of
the behavior of each individual player – as I do here. Each player fights in 50% of the
encounters. There are hard methodological and philosophical questions to be put to either
interpretation. I criticize the evolutionary interpretation in [verbeek, forthcoming #848].
5  Here we see one of the problems associated with the evolutionary interpretation of strategies
as strategy profiles of a population. In order to calculate whether the system is in equilibrium
we have to imagine that an average representative of each type of population is matched against
the other. But, as I just stipulated, if we interpret the strategy pairs as descriptions of the
evolutionary state of a population, it is hard to imagine which interpretation we can give to
such matching.
6 Note also that the opponents of I will receive 1.5 regardless of the strategy they follow. This
follows from the fact that the equilibrium strategy is a mixed strategy. Mixed strategies are
“equalizer strategies”.
7  Smith, John Maynard (1982), Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.. Smith is a bit sloppy in his formulation here. Strictly speaking, a strategy is
an ESS not only if no single mutant could invade the population, but also if that is not possible
for very small groups of mutants. In the formal definition, this is taken into account.
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The equilibrium strategy that fights with p=0.5 satisfies these two
conditions. We have already demonstrated that (1) holds, so now we only need
to verify that (2) holds. Since E(I,I)=E(J,I), I is an ESS if and only if E(I,J)>E(J,J).
That is, the mixed equilibrium is stable if and only if it does better against
mutants than the mutants against themselves. Let J fight with probability q,
then E(J,J)= 3+q-q2. E(I,J)=3.5-q which is larger than E(J,J) for any value of q.8
The stability of I means that the contestants will actually fight in 25% of their
encounters. In such a situation there is no norm to respect someone’s property
worthy of that name. It is not so far fetched to stipulate that a society that is
described by the parameters of this model is in a state of nature, that is, a state
in which there are no norms.
So far, we have assumed that the agents in this model are stripped of any
knowledge except for what classic game theory allows them. That is, they do
not know anything of the situation, other than the payoffs in the matrix. Does
that matter? Modern evolutionary game theory has shown convincingly that it
does. Perhaps the most elegant way of bringing this out is given by Skyrms
(1996) and [Vanderschraaf, 1995 #846], though the idea is older.9 Suppose both
contestants were to observe something a signal that is strictly speaking
exogenous to the game. For example, suppose they were to observe who has
possession of the resource before the encounter. Then they could adopt a
contingency strategy that would lead them to one of the equilibria in pure
strategies. For example, they could play the strategy “if possessor fight, if
challenger give in”.
If the population were to adopt such a strategy each individual will do
better than under the symmetrical, mixed equilibrium. What is more, in the
chicken game the asymmetrical strategy pairs each are an ESS and the mixed
strategy is not. To see this, let pA be the probability with which a player chooses
                                                
8 A less formal way to elucidate the stability of the mixed equilibrium is the following. Assume
that a population of 100 individuals is in equilibrium when half the population fights and half
the population gives in. Suppose that one person in this population switches strategy, the
chance that the other person will fight in the next encounter is no longer 0.5, but 0.51. In that
case giving in becomes marginally more attractive than fighting, so the pressure is on the
fighters to give in until the equilibrium is established once again.
9 It can be found in Lewis, David (1969), Convention: A Philosophical Study , Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Smith, John Maynard (1982), Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Sugden, Robert (1986), The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, Oxford: Basil Blackwell..
The insight that an ESS in a game with more than one ESS can be selected as result of an
correlated equilibrium is relatively new. It has several advantages to think of the selection of
the ESS in this way, most notably, it allows for the evolution of meaningful signals in a state of
nature. See also [Vanderschraaf, 1995 #846].
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to give in when challenger, and pB be the probability with this player chooses to
give in when possessor. A strategy in the game of figure 1 can be described as
the pair (pA, pB). Suppose I is the asymmetrical strategy which plays “When
challenger give in; when possessor fight”, or in our notation, (1,0).10 Let J=(qA,
qB) be a mutant strategy, with qA ¹ 1 and qB ¹ 0. Finally, let us assume that the
probability that a player is possessor equals 0.5. In other words, one has an
even chance to being possessor (or rather, first possessor) as one has chance to
be challenger.11
Substituting the values of figure 1, we can calculate E(I,I) and E(J,I):
(3) E(I,I)= 0.5[E(IA,IB)+E(IB,IA)=2 (where IA and IB stand for
following strategy I when A and when B respectively)
(4) E(J,I)=0.5[E(JA, IB)+E(JB,IA)]=0.5[qA+2qB+3(1-qB)]=1.5+0.5qA-
0.5qB
To meet the equilibrium condition (1) it has to be the case that E(I,I) ³ E(J,I). This
inequality holds if and only if 0.5 ³ 0.5qA-0.5qB, which is necessarily true. So I is
an equilibrium strategy. Since I ¹ J, it follows that qA ¹ 1 and qB ¹ 0. But then
E(I,I)>E(J,I) and the stability condition (2) is satisfied. Therefore, I is also
stable.12
What this means is that in a population of I-players a deviation from that
regularity immediately generates “punishment” for the deviant. Not because
others react negatively to the deviation, but because it generates a bad result in
comparison to what could have been had the rule been followed. Such
regularities then are, as Sugden (1986) puts it, self-enforcing. Should an agent
deviate from the norm, others in the population have no incentive to deviate as
well if the equilibrium is stable.
One can also see how such a stable strategy would emerge in a population
that previously did not follow it. In the chicken game, suppose some members
of the population deviate from this mixed strategy, i.e., no longer give in with
p=0.5, but adopt the strategy “Give in when challenger, otherwise fight.” An
                                                
10 Note that the mixed equilibrium then can be described by the probability pair (0.5, 0.5).
11 This last assumption is not necessary for the proof of stability, however it facilitates the
arithmetic considerably.
12 Note that the alternative strategy K=(0,1) is also stable. However, in a population consisting
mainly of I-followers it would do very poorly indeed. This is precisely the point of the stability
criterion. All that stability implies is that new arrivals in a population consisting of agents
following a stable strategy are most successful if they also follow that strategy.
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individual deviant agent has no reason to rethink her decision in the next
round. No matter how many in the population will keep on playing the mixed
strategy, she herself is doing at least as well as the others who continue to play
the mixed strategy. However, if she happens to encounter one of the other
agents who play the same asymmetrical strategy, these two are able to generate
better results for themselves than the rest of the population. As we have seen
above, the expected payoff for this agent is 1.5 if she plays against an agent who
follows the mixed equilibrium strategy. But should she encounter a fellow
deviating agent who follows the same strategy as she does, she will receive an
expected payoff of 2 on average. Thus, one can expect that other individuals,
once they learn which signal the deviant strategy is using for her asymmetrical
strategy, will adopt that strategy as well.13
Stability is an important feature in the analysis of norms. It corresponds to
the second of our criteria for the existence of a norm, that is, deviations from
the regularity are possible without the regularity necessarily collapsing in the
subsequent rounds. Stability, therefore, is an interesting feature to look for.
Indeed, it plays a central role in the definition of conventions. The strategy of
“Giving in when challenger, otherwise fight” is a convention, which is defined
as any stable equilibrium in a game that has two or more equilibria.
“Giving in when challenger, otherwise fight” is the accepted convention
since there are more possible equilibria in the distribution of scarce resources.
Other signals than possession could be used. Moreover, the convention cold
equally well be “giving in when possessor, otherwise fight”.
§4 Some preliminary remarks on the model
Returning to the central characteristics of conventionalism discussed in section
1, we can now see why evolutionary game theoretical analysis of norms is a
form of conventionalism. To think of social norms as conventions in this
technical sense means that one accepts the thesis of conformity with regards to
them. Once one sees that if, for example, “The first possessor owns a particular
resources” is the accepted convention in a particular community, this implies
that it is rational to observe that right precisely because (almost) everybody else
                                                
13 In [Verbeek, forthcoming #848] I utter some reservations about the way one should think of
the learning of the conventional strategy. In particular, I do not believe that we can model
“social evolution” after the way in which biological evolution operates.
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observes it. Therefore, conformity explains why reductionism is true for the
norm to respect property.
The truth of reductionism does not lead one to be skeptical with respect to
the normative force of norms. A standard criticism of the view that it is rational
to comply with norms is that it leads to a dilemma. Either it is rational to do
what the rule prescribes, but then it is rational for reasons other than the rule
(e.g., because it is utility maximizing to do so). Or these other reasons do not
obtain, but then it is hard to see why it is rational to comply with the norm.
Therefore, either the rule is superfluous, or compliance is irrational. The
conventionalist analysis of norms avoids this dilemma. It shows that one can be
rational in genuinely complying with a norm (that is, one of several possible
stable equilibria) precisely because the norm requires one to act in a certain
way.
Finally, one should be careful when making straightforward inferences
from these results to actual rules of property. The whole set of rules we refer to
as the norms of property – if you will, the institution of property – is much more
complex than this analysis of “first seizure” norms might lead one to conclude.
For example are the rules for the transfer of property also stable equilibria in a
chicken game? Having said that, it does not mean that I am a skeptic about the
whole enterprise of showing that the norms of property are conventions.
However, I doubt that all norms of the institution of property can be
interpreted as stable equilibria in chicken games.
§5 Deviation from the norm
Having discussed the model at length, we should return to our original
question whether evolutionary game theory is successful as an analysis of
norms. We have seen that norms should be understood as more or less
spontaneous patterns of regularity in the behavior of members of a group
(characteristic (1)). We have seen that these regularities can spread in a
population through an evolutionary process, which we could interpret as
learning (characteristic (2)).14 We have seen, moreover, that the stability of the
norms can be traced back to the nature of the norms themselves; that is,
                                                
14 Actually, I have several objections to this claim. I am unconvinced that we can think of
learning as a process of replicator dynamics, at least not as this process is usually understood.
See also [Verbeek, forthcoming #848].
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conventions are self-enforcing. This self-enforcing character is the result of the
fact that agents following the norm stand to benefit more than deviants. In
other words, it is rational to comply with norms because they have a
conventional character.
This is as far as evolutionary game theory can bring us towards a deeper
understanding of norms. In order to account for the subsequent defining
characteristics of norms we will have to introduce additional assumptions.
Some of these are at odds with evolutionary game theory.
The third of the criteria presented in section 1 is that deviation from the
norm is possible. In other words, agents can break the norm. So if norms are to
be understood as conventions in the technical sense in which it is used here, we
need to know if deviation from the convention is possible.
On the face of it, this seems an anomaly within the conventionalist model.
After all, the whole analysis of conformity to social norms is based on the
notion that it is conducive to the agent’s goals and preferences to conform.
Conventions are supposed to be self-enforcing. So if social norms are to be
understood as conventions, conformity with them is straightforwardly rational.
This poses the theory with a dilemma. Either deviation from the
equilibrium that forms the convention is sometimes rational or it is not. If the
former is the case, the convention is not an equilibrium. According to the
definition of an ESS given in section 3, if strategy I is an ESS, it must be a best
reply against itself. In other words, I must be an equilibrium. Now if there are
alternative strategies that do better than I in a population consisting mainly of
I-players, I is not an equilibrium. So if norms are conventions defined in terms
of the ESS criterion, then it cannot be rational to deviate from them. Moreover,
if the conventional rule is not an equilibrium it could not have emerged in the
first place. For what could be the incentive for a rational agent to change
strategies and start playing I?
The other horn of the dilemma is the following. If it turns out that rational
agents will never deviate from the convention, the case for emergence can still
be made as well for the conventional character of the regularity in question. But
then we are stuck with the conclusion that conventions cannot be norms since
an essential ingredient of the characterization of norms in section 3 is that
deviation is possible. Something has to give here: either the possibility of
deviation can be accommodated in the model, or it should disappear from the
list presented in section 3.
The obvious way in which the possibility of deviation could be
accommodated in the model while avoiding the dilemma is to argue that
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deviation could occur but that it is irrational. However, that does not seem to
be true of all actual existing norms.15 Many modern conventionalists are aware
of this. For example, Sugden (1986) mentions three reasons why people would
deviate from the norm. First, people make mistakes. Conventions have to be
learned. Human agents may fail to grasp the strategies involved or they may
interpret them incorrectly (i.e., unconventionally). Secondly, Sugden argues
people sometimes are weak-willed and they break the norm because of their
lack of will power. People sometimes are not able to withstand the temptation
to act in a way they know to be detrimental to their own interests. Just like the
first explanation, this one avoids the dilemma by recognizing that deviation is
irrational.16
However, Sugden also believes there are situations in which it is in one’s
interest not to follow the norm. For example, in the chicken game an agent,
Boris, being extremely strong, might decide that he is willing to challenge a
small-built possessor and fight him. The costs Boris will incur might be
considerably less than the value of the resource to him in this specific case. A
plausible conventionalist theory of norms has to admit that considerations such
as these might lead to deviations from the established convention. By the same
token, such a theory has to give an explanation of these deviations. As we have
seen, the possibility of rational deviations challenges the very point of the
conventionalist enterprise. For here we have genuine instances where deviation
from an established convention is beneficial.
Basically, there are two ways to incorporate these considerations in the
model. First, we could assume that norm following agents are to some extend
characterized by moral motives, or cooperative virtues, as I will call them.
These motives prevent them from deviating under such circumstances.
Alternatively, one could assume that norms are backed up by sanctions. The
                                                
15 One example is the rule that one ought to have a valid ticket in public transport in my
hometown of Amsterdam.
16 In [Verbeek, forthcoming #848] I argue that the assumption of weakness of the will does not
fit well within the idea that conventions spread through social evolution, because the genetic
algorithms that are used to model this evolutionary process do not assume conscious
rationality or knowledge on behalf of the player. Instead players are modeled as mimicking or
copying each other’s behavior. This makes sense in a biological framework, but seems hard to
defend in a social context.
Another complication is that, in order for such a thing as weakness of the will to be
possible, one has to make assumptions about the psychology of agents, about the structure of
their will, e.g., along the lines sketched by Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971), "Freedom of the Will and
the Concept of a Person", Journal of Philosophy 68: 5-20. or Watson, Gary (1975), "Free Agency",
Ibid. 72: 205-220.. If one therefore wants to work out the notion of weakness of will within the
framework of the theory of rational choice as it is applied in the conventionalist analysis, one
needs a more elaborate framework than is presently available. This is not an easy task, but an
attempt is made in [Verbeek, forthcoming #848].
Contribution APA 1999, version 19 June 2001
13
deterrent effect of sanctions prevents deviance where this otherwise might be
beneficial.17
§6 Sanctions
The typical reaction to deviation from a norm comes in the form of a sanction.
The received view is that norms need sanctions to be stable. If sanctions were
too light, or indeed absent, people would not obey social norms and
consequently, such norms would disappear. Hobbes has often been interpreted
as subscribing to this view. Such a view is, on the face of it, diametrically
opposed to the central insight of the conventionalist project. Whereas the
former claims the need for a system of sanctions, the latter argues that norms
do not need sanctions for their stability since they are self-enforcing.
Is there room for sanctions in our model of property norms? In section 2, I
claimed that one of the criteria of a norm is that deviation is met with criticism
and that this criticism is a reason for the deviant to revise his or her behavior.
The first question is why an otherwise rational agent would punish the past
deviant actions of another agent. On the face of it, punishment seems pointless
since the harm has been done already. Besides there are quite a number of costs
associated with the practice of punishing. First, detection of deviant behavior
often involves costs. Police departments all over the world spend a
considerable amount of resources on criminal investigations. Parents spend
long tedious discussions with their children to find out who took the cookies
from the jar. The time such discussions take could have been spent on more
pleasurable activities.
Secondly, sanctioning itself can be very costly. Imprisonment in a standard
facility costs society more (on average per inmate) than the rent of a modest
apartment. Informal sanctions can also be very costly. In most big cities there is
an incentive to “look the other way” when a crime is being committed,
especially if it is a violent one. After all, if you intervene the perpetrator might
turn on you instead.
Being punished is usually costly for the deviant. In general the loss of
freedom due to a prison sentence is considerable and is valued negatively.
Similarly with informal sanctions: to be ostracized by one’s fellows is a sanction
most people seek to avoid. Therefore, we can assume that sanctions can be a
                                                
17 Of course, these two assumptions are not incompatible.
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reason to avoid deviance. Whether this is because of its deterrent effect on the
potential deviant, or because of the assurance to third parties, I will not discuss
here.
Against the costs of punishment there is only one possible benefit for the
agent who sanctions. Other possible deviants might be persuaded not to break
the convention in the future and the deviant in question might be convinced to
revise his behavior as a result of all the sanctions. But this benefit typically
extends to other members of society as well. If my punishing you deters you
from future deviation, it is not only me who benefits but also everybody else
with whom you will interact in the future. So while we can understand why
criticism, in the form of costly punishments, can be a reason for the deviant to
revise his or her behavior (namely because of its deterrent effect on future
behavior), we still have a problem regarding the question why one would
punish a deviant given that it is costly to do so.
I refrain from giving these comments a more formal treatment here.18 It
turns out that even in a simple coordination game, in which there is a minimal
degree of conflict of interests, the detection of deviance and the production of
sanctions is problematic. In fact, it turns out that a system of sanctions is itself a
collective good; a collective good that presupposes norms for its production,
distribution, and application.
In general, there are two kinds of interaction problems involved in these
norms of sanctions. First, there are coordination problems. The question is who
will administer the sanctions. That remains a real problem even if the
population has all the characteristics of a so-called privileged group, i.e., it is
the case that for at least some individuals the costs of detection and punishment
are outweighed by the benefits of less (or no) deviations from the convention in
the future.19 Secondly, there are serious n-person prisoner’s dilemmas. Given
that it is costly to detect and punish deviants, there is always the temptation not
to contribute. The more so since the benefits of anybody’s contribution to the
system of sanctions fall equally on every member of the population. In other
words, even if it is clear who has to contribute, there is still the problem that for
those agents individually not contributing dominates contributing.
                                                
18 In [Verbeek, forthcoming #848] I give an elaborate analysis of the problems related to the
production of sanctions.
19  For the notion of privileged groups, see Olson, Mancur (1965), The Logic of Collective Action,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. See also Hampton, Jean (1987), "Free Rider Problems in
the Production of Collective Goods", Economics and Philosophy 3: 245-273..
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§7 Sanctions and cooperative virtues
What has this analysis taught us? In the first place, it has become clear that the
detection of deviance and the production of punishment is not necessarily a
rational reaction to the violation of a convention. The pattern that emerges here
is the following. Once we allow for sanctions to be part of what makes a
convention into a norm (and indeed we have good reasons to do so), we find
that the production of those sanctions already presupposes the existence of a
norm prescribing sanctioning in such cases. Those norms should also be
understood as conventions in the sense of evolutionary game theory.
Following Kavka (1983), I will refer to such norms as higher-order norms.
They are norms regulating the coordination and production of the sanctions
associated with the deviance from other, lower-order social norms. Given the
analysis in section 5, it should be possible that otherwise rational agents
sometimes deviate from those conventions. The next question is “What
happens if a higher-order norm is violated?” If we hold on to the notion that an
essential ingredient of a norm is that deviance is met with sanctions, then
deviance from a higher-order norm should also be met with sanctions.
However, given that a system of sanctions is itself a collective good, there is a
need for yet higher-order norms to regulate the production of those sanctions.
In other words, we have started a regress where every norm is backed up by an
infinite set of higher-order norms regulating the sanctioning.
The poses a problem for the conventionalist project. The analysis of
deviation we gave in section 5 showed that a certain degree of violation of a
norm can be expected given the sources of deviance that Sugden mentions. But
if it is true that there are infinitely many higher-order norms connected to any
first-order norm, there will be a substantial amount of norm violations.
Suppose somebody violates a first-order norm. Then there is a second-order
norm that prescribes punishment. This norm can be broken, in which case there
is a third-order norm prescribing punishment. This norm can be broken, and so
on. What this means is that the possibility of violating any first-order norm
brings with it the possibility of more norm violations.
To see this, suppose that the rate of deviance with regards to a certain first-
order norm in a population is q, where 0 < q < 1. Suppose that this rate is
constant with respect to all the higher-order norms related to this one. That
would mean that the chance of norm deviance with regards to this first-order
norm or any of its higher-order norms is: 
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is always larger than q itself. That means in fact that violation of a first-order
norm brings with it more violations of other (higher-order) norms. It also
implies that, as long as the rate of deviance is not too large, i.e., q < 0.5, the
chance that there will be any violation of the first-order norm or any of its
higher-order norms is smaller than 1. There is no certainty of deviation.
Is this increase of the chance of violations a problem? Evolutionary game
theory argues that it is not. In the limit, there will be no more deviance. The
claim is that at each higher level the chance of deviance is smaller. What is the
chance that at the nth level the norm to punish those violating the n-1 norm will
be broken? In order for the norm on the nth level to be applicable, violations up
to the n-1 level have to have occurred. This chance then is exactly   q
n . Given
that 0 £  q < 1, this chance approaches 0 as n increases. In other words, at some
sufficiently higher level, the norms will no longer be broken. Insofar as a norm
depends on sanctions for its stability (and we have seen that it does not do so
exclusively), the regress is not a problem.
However, the regress could be vicious. As we have seen there is only so
much deviation that a convention can withstand. Once the number of
deviations becomes too large, for whatever reason, it pays to switch strategies
as well. This holds for first-order norms, but of course also for higher-order
norms. So suppose that a convention of the nth-order to punish non-punishers
of the n-1 order changes as result of the all too frequent noncompliance (for
whatever reason). That means that the convention to punish those not
participating in the system of sanctions of the n-1 order is subject to pressure to
change as well. And so on all the way down. Therefore, the more elaborate the
system of sanctions related to a certain first-order norm, the less stable the first-
order norm is. In other words, the regress can be a vicious one. The regress
gains in viciousness if we introduce loops in the chain of punishment. If it is
possible that an agent will be called upon to punish negligence to punish
negligence to punish. . . himself, there is even less incentive to punish.
Why would this vicious regress be a problem? Well, it is a problem to the
extent a system of social norms depends on the presence of sanctions to ensure
compliance. So we need to break the chain of higher-order sanctions
somewhere. It is at this point that cooperative virtues play an important role.
The idea is that somewhere in the chain the agents should be disposed to
comply with the norms applicable to them.
For example, if normal citizens break the law, judges punish them. Judges
are bound by norms in their jurisdiction and their discretion. They are judged
by higher judges should they break norms or not apply them properly, and so
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all the way up to the Supreme Court. On this level however, we cannot expect
the judges to occasionally break the law, even if that would be in their own
interests. We can and have to expect that they will uphold the law according to
the norms laid down for their conduct. In other words, this is a level where the
cooperative virtues need to be internalized to a large extent. A plausible theory
of norms therefore needs to presuppose the existence of such dispositions.
§8 Resentment
If the analysis of conventions is correct and the possibility of deviating from
them is allowed, this seems to imply that conventions are best understood as
rules of thumb. They would be sources of advice on how to act in standard
situations, allowing her to act otherwise in certain admittedly exceptional
situations. In general it is best to stick to the rule, but a situation could come up
where it is not rational to do so and if one realizes this, one should not conform
to the rule.20 Also, as we have seen in the previous sections, there is nothing
about conventions that implies that agents necessarily react in a negative way to
deviations. That just depends on the effect sanctions will have, as well as the
several other factors identified in section 7. Hence the charge that we are to
understand conventions as rules of thumb.21
However, this is not how we typically think of the norms that regulate
social life. In other words, the question now before us is whether the analysis of
norms as conventions falls short of the mark. It cannot account for the last three
characteristics of norms, which refer to the so-called “internal” aspect of norms.
Indeed if norms are indeed conventions we need to establish that conventions
have some moral force. Some authors have proposed that a psychological
mechanism gives conventions this force.22 This is the mechanism of resentment.
People resent deviant behavior. More precisely, people resent it if others
behave in a manner that is contrary to their expectations and this resentment is
a spontaneous reaction to deviant behavior.23
                                                
20 Note that if this were all that there is to conventionalism, it would be very similar to a form
of indirect utilitarianism.
21 For a related worry, see Sugden (1986, 149).
22 Most notably, Pettit, Philip (1990), "Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives", Ethics
100: 725-755.
Sugden, Robert (1986), The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, Oxford: Basil Blackwell..
23 Pettit, Philip (1990), "Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives", Ethics 100: 725-755.
argues that rational choice theorists have focused on the costs of sanctions too much. He
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The spontaneous and emotional aspect that is associated with the term
‘resentment’ is very fortunate. For what we are looking for are not the type of
well-calculated choices rational agents make in deciding how to react to
somebody who does not behave as they expected. Rather we are looking for the
type of plain anger that deviation arouses in most people. This reaction is not
necessarily a rational reaction (i.e., instrumental in the pursuit of one’s goals,
whatever they are) on a traditional understanding of rationality. We are, in
effect, leaving the framework of analysis discussed in section 6.24
In order to understand how it is possible that such resentful reactions
cause deviating agents to revise their behavior, it has to be the case that the
expectations of other agents do matter to deviants. Moreover, the anticipation
of such resentment is a reason not to deviate from the established convention.
Resentment should have a deterrent effect. If the way in which resentment
causes deviant agents to revise their behavior is a rational response, it is unclear
why it is so. On one reading, we can interpret the assumption that the
expectations of others matter to us as postulating a desire that (most) agents in
fact have. This is the interpretation Sugden and Pettit endorse.25
From now on I will refer to both the spontaneous reaction of resentment
and the assumed propensity of the expectations of others to motivate us as the
mechanism of resentment. If one accepts that there is such a mechanism, it seems
that we have a model that accounts for all aspects of norms. We have an
explanation why, in general, people obey norms and we have an explanation
why the occasional deviation is met with negative reactions that cause deviants
to revise their behavior.26 In short, it seems that we have a complete analysis of
norms. If such a mechanism is present, we have an account of norms as
conventions that seems to cover almost all the elements listed in section 3. What
                                                                                                                                              
stresses that we should replace what he calls the interest-based explanation of norms with an
attitude-based explanation of norms. The point of the latter is that punishment is not necessarily
costly since it may be a spontaneous reaction to deviance. Detection need not cost anything
either since a sanction can be the spontaneous reaction to deviance when confronted with it.
Pettit is referring to such things as the spontaneous criticisms of bystanders or victims when
confronted by deviance and other forms of sanctions with an informal character. Such an
attitude-based explanation is exactly what Sugden is proposing here.
24 Therefore, I disagree with Pettit that such spontaneous resentful reactions are without cost.
Rather, the associated costs are irrelevant to the resenting agent.
25 In the next section, I defend an alternative understanding of the role of resentment and why
it can have an impact on human agents. People do not conform to the expectations of others for
fear their behavior might be resented. Rather, people feel resentment because they have reasons
to expect compliant behavior other than the potential resentment.
26 Sugden (1986) and Pettit (1990) are not the only authors who assume that something like the
mechanism of resentment is “in the head” of norm-obeying agents. Elster, Jon (1990), "Norms of
Revenge", Ethics 100: 826-885. and Frank, Robert (1988), Passions within Reason, London: W. W.
Norton & Company, Inc. share these ideas.
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is more, it looks like we can avoid the introduction of moral motives into the
analysis altogether. Whatever more formal sanctions cannot bring about is
achieved through the mechanism of resentment.
§9 Moral force and resentment
There is still, however, a deficiency in the conventionalist analysis of social
norms. It is this deficiency I seek to expose in this section. This deficiency will
throw an alternative light on the mechanism of resentment and its proper role.
What is lacking is an analysis of the last of the aspects of norms listed in section
1, to wit, the requirement that the negative reaction to deviant behavior is
regarded as reasonable, as fitting, by the agents concerned. This requirement is
not accounted for in the mechanism of resentment. An analysis of resentment
that does offer criteria for this reasonability necessitates us to assume that norm
following agents are characterized by moral motives.
Resentment involves the following aspects: (1) The resentment concerns
other agents and their actions; (2) resentment involves that the interests of the
one who resents are at stake and the one who is resented knows this to be the
case; (3) resentment implies mutual expectations about each other’s behavior;
and (4) these expectations presuppose moral motives of the kind that I will
refer to as cooperative virtues.27
Condition (1) is easily verified. One does not feel resentment against the
outburst of Mount Pinatubo volcano, no matter how much damage it has done
or the degree in which one’s expectations about the likelihood of the event were
reasonable.28 Conditions (1) and (2) imply that resentment is a backward-
looking response. It follows after someone’s actions have damaged one’s
interests. This means that resentment is to be distinguished from negative
reactions that aim at correcting the deviant in such a way that she will conform
on future occasions. In the latter type of actions, future conforming behavior is
intended. In the case of resentment there is no such intention. All that the agent
intends to do is to express her indignation to the deviant. Resentment focuses
on antecedent events. This antecedence is conceptual, not necessarily temporal,
in its nature. If one anticipates that one’s interests will be damaged for no good
                                                
27 I am agnostic about the question whether these conditions are necessary, sufficient or
neither. I simply assume that they tell us something about the phenomenon of resentment
28 Except of course when one lives in an animistic culture where one’s worldview allows for
personification of such things as volcanoes.
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reason, there seems to be a good cause for resentment even though the actual
harm has not yet occurred.
Damage to one’s interests should not be interpreted simply as damage
directly to one’s own interests. Some people resent breaches of conventions
which damage the interests of others. For example, the outrage people feel
when they hear of a drunk who, by driving on the left, has caused a serious
accident. They were not directly influenced. However, one could argue that
they were indirectly concerned. The presence of people not following the
convention is a threat to my interests even when I am not directly involved. I
might meet them sometime in a similar situation. Also it might be a threat to
the continuation of the convention. If some people no longer stop at red traffic
lights this could induce a collapse of the rule to stop for red traffic lights. This
presumably is detrimental to my interests as a user of roads. Traffic will be less
safe. So interests of the one who resents are at stake whether directly or
indirectly.29
It could be argued that resentment is itself arbitrary. People feel
resentment concerning all kinds of things. The situation in former Yugoslavia is
cause for general outrage, as is the outcome of the war of 1812, the institution of
slavery as it occurred more than hundred years ago, and so on. In none of these
situations can it be argued that the interests of the agents who feel this
resentment are at stake. I would hesitate to refer to it as resentment, but rather
reserve the term indignation for it. Resentment, as I understand it, refers to a
very specific class of cases. It concerns the damage to one’s interest or to those
of others within the group in which the particular convention that is violated is
established.30
The second clause of condition (2) – i.e. that the resented knows the
interests of others are at stake – more or less implies condition (1). Actions
involve intentions. If an act is an act of hurting somebody’s interests this means
that the actor intends this effect, or is aware that this is a side effect of his
action. If not, it is not an act of hurting at all. For example, if I hurt you
unintentionally you may feel anger that I did not know, or blame me for not
knowing, but you do not resent me simply because of this harming action. A
                                                
29 Another defense of this line of argument invokes the third condition: this driver exploits other
peoples’ compliance with the traffic rules. Because others stick to the rules the risk to him of
drunken-driving has become acceptable in spite of the consequences to the other participants in
the traffic. This driver then acted unfairly.
30 Of course one could argue that the international community has its own norms, international
laws, that are within the scope of conventionalism just as more local norms are. Then, in my
terminology, the reaction of people to the atrocities of the Serbs in Bosnia is an example of
resentment, since the interests of the international community are at stake.
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very common form of excuse for harm done is “I am sorry. . ., I did not realize. .
. .” The fact that this functions as an excuse, as a statement to avoid unjustified
resentment, shows also that knowledge of the interests at stake is a crucial
precondition to resentment.
The third condition introduces the mutual expectations of the actors
concerned. These mutual expectations typically are (based on) conventions.
Resentment, therefore, follows deviance from a convention. In what follows I
will show, by using an example, why the phenomenon of resentment involves
mutual behavioral expectations. It will become clear why these expectations
presuppose the moral motives of fairness and trustworthiness (the fourth
requirement).
Suppose there are two entrepreneurs, A and B, who compete on the local
market for pins. One way of competition, legally open to them, would be to
start selling pins for less than the cost of production, in order to gain a
substantial share of the market. If both were to do so simultaneously, they
would loose a lot of money. If just one were to do that for a short period, this
entrepreneur would increase his share of the market substantively, while his
competitor would almost be out of business. In other words, these two are
engaged in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma. Suppose that they agree informally
not to start a price war thus ensuring their mutual stable profits. A and B both
rely on the norms laid down in this agreement.31 Both expect that the other will
honor the agreement. Moreover, each expects that the other expects that they
expect, and so on, that they will honor the agreement. In other words, the code
laid down in the agreement becomes a convention in their market behavior.
Suppose that A at one point does not honor the agreement because it is
especially advantageous for him to renege at that point. He dumps a large
amount of pins under the cost price. B resents this. He will resent this because it
was reasonable for him to expect that A would not violate the agreement
between them. Now if A had reneged on the agreement from the beginning, B
would not have come to believe that A would honor the agreement. Nor would
B believe that A believes that B believes that A would honor the agreement, etc.
The course of events would not have warranted the belief that A would honor
the agreement. In that case, B might be sad that they did not succeed in
coordinating their pricing policies, or deplore A’s shortsightedness, but he
would not resent what A did. B resents that A reneges and gains advantage
                                                
31 Or rather, A and B rely on the norms specified in the contract against the background of an
established convention that prescribes honoring one’s agreements.
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knowing that B would honor the agreement. In other words, A exploits B’s
preparedness to honor the agreement. This preparedness, as we have seen, is
based on the existence of the mutual expectations about honoring the
agreement. The presence of such beliefs makes B’s resentment of A’s behavior
reasonable and intelligible in the first place. This illustrates that resentment
presupposes the existence of mutual expectations as stated in condition (3).
This is different from the way Sugden and Pettit believe resentment works.
For them, B could be said to resent A regardless of the existence of those
previous mutual expectations. If A had made it clear at the time of the
agreement that he would renege on the agreement as soon as it would be in his
interest to do so, B’s reaction – no matter how unreasonable – would still be a
matter of resentment. Moreover, it would be a reaction that would matter to A,
regardless that it is totally unreasonable. It is clear from the example that I find
their explanation implausible.
What would make it reasonable for B to expect that A would indeed honor
the agreement? After all, we stipulated that it was an informal contract with
none of the legal sanctions applicable to enforce it. In other words, why did B
trust A to honor the contract? Several reasons spring to mind. First, B might
count on A’s rationality, reasoning that it is in A’s interest to honor the
agreement as this is the best way to maximize his profits. However, that is not
real trust. What is more, the example shows that it is probably not true that it is
in A’s interest here and now to uphold his end of the agreement. These are
exactly the instances in which we are interested in the discussion of the role of
resentment in the conventionalist theory. Resentment comes into the picture
precisely in those situations where it is rational to deviate from the convention.
A second, possible and more important reason why it is reasonable for B to
trust A is B’s belief that A is trustworthy. He believes that A will not let him
down even when it occasionally might be advantageous to do so, not for some
external reason, but because B trusts him. Since A will hold similar beliefs
about B, their respective trustworthiness uphold their mutual expectations.
Trust, then, is important to understand why the expectations about each other’s
behaviors based on the convention are reasonable, even when it is occasionally
rational not to live up to those expectations. Trust assumes trustworthiness, or
at least the expectation of it; therefore condition (4) is fulfilled as well.32 Where
                                                
32 I discuss the relation between trust and trustworthiness at some length in [Verbeek,
forthcoming #848].
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there is resentment, moral motives (e.g., trustworthiness) help explain why the
expectations that form the background of the resentment are reasonable.
What is more, because of these moral motives we can understand that the
reasonability of one’s expectations in itself is not enough to explain resentment.
These motives are necessary to understand why our expectations are
reasonable to begin with, but they also explain something else. Consider again
B’s reaction to A’s reneging. B is not just stating his surprise that A did not live
up to his reasonable expectations. Nor is he urging A to stick to the agreement
the next time since that would serve both their competitive interests best.
Resentment is more than that. It is the outrage that one feels because the other
“has let me down”; the anger that follows the realization that the other “has
exploited me”. This passionate reaction is understandable against the
background of the sort of moral motives I described.
It might be helpful to point out once more the differences and similarities
between the view of Sugden and Pettit and mine on this point. Whereas Sugden
assumes that resentment is the result of a psychological disposition that reacts
to falsified expectations, my view is that resentment is a reasonable reaction in
so far as these expectations themselves are reasonable. Sugden assumes the
existence of another psychological mechanism, such that the expectations of
others matter to us. On my view it is not resentment that explains why people
would feel the moral force of a norm even when it is in their interest to deviate
here and now. People feel the moral force of norms precisely because they see
that the expectations of others about their behavior based on this norm are
reasonable. In order to explain why this is reasonable (and not just rational),
one needs to point at certain moral motives, cooperative virtues, such as
trustworthiness. Sugden thinks he can do without these.
This analysis of resentment and its relation to norms and moral motives is
not restricted to pin manufacturers such as A and B. It is fundamental to all
social norms whether they are traffic regulations, norms of taxation or
conventions of reciprocity. Insofar as it is possible that sometimes it is in the
interest of the agent to deviate, we have to suppose that such deviations usually
are met with resentment and that this resentment is intelligible as such only
against the background of the four conditions I mentioned.
This is not to say that each and every agent following a norm is morally
disposed in such a manner. What is being supposed is that each agent expects
that others are, in general, trustworthy, fair; in short, that others are morally
motivated in following a norm. Moreover, such expectations are reciprocal.
These expectations make resentment of deviant behavior reasonable. Finally,
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the existence of such expectations will stand up to rational scrutiny if and only
if there is a general tendency that agents have such moral motives. In other
words, the mutual expectations about each other’s trustworthiness have to be
founded on something. This foundation is supplied by moral motives. Most
people who interact with each other according to social norms are morally
motivated.
What does this prove? We have seen that resentment is characterized by
certain conditions. These conditions contain the possibility and the presence of
a cooperative virtue, e.g., trustworthiness. This also explains why other
people’s expectations matter to us even when the resentment of others is all the
“punishment” we receive for not living up to reasonable expectations. Ideally
rational actors probably might be indifferent to this “punishment”, yet most
flesh-and-blood people are not. This means that people are likely to feel
emotions varying from uneasiness to guilt when they break a norm, i.e., when
they do not honor the reasonable, justifiable expectations of others.
§10 Conclusions
We are now in a position to see that evolutionary game theoretical explanations
of norms have to assume moral motives. We have seen at several places within
the theory that cooperative virtues are necessary. First, in those situations in
which it is be rational to deviate from the norm. The second place where we
saw the need for cooperative virtues emerging was in the context of sanctions.
The third place where cooperative virtues prop up in the theory is in the
discussion of resentment. We saw that we need to have cooperative virtues to
explain, first, why in some cases it is reasonable to suppose people will conform
to the convention. Secondly, cooperative virtues are necessary to come to grips
with the often passionate character of resentment in response to norm
violations. Resentment is not an expression of surprise, nor is it urging the
other to conform the next time. Rather resentment is the emotional response to
unfair or untrustworthy behavior, a response to “being let down” by (the)
other(s).
In any group or society where social norms are stable, the members of that
group are characterized by a certain degree of cooperative virtuousness. Does
this mean that game theory is unimportant for a plausible theory of social
norms? Should we instead focus on the appropriate psychology of norm
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following agents? I do not think so. Evolutionary game theory has earned its
place in textbooks in social science and philosophy. I do not know of a single
alternative theoretical model that comes so close to the mark when it comes
down to formulating a complete and plausible (for conventionalist) theory the
nature of social norms. However, I hope it is clear that we are not there yet.
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